US and UK Defence Strategies Converge on China Challenge Amid Evolving Transatlantic Partnership

LONDON, 24 January 2026 – Four years after the United States published its landmark 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and one year following the UK’s comprehensive Strategic Defence Review (SDR), defence analysts are examining how both nations’ strategic frameworks address shared challenges while navigating an increasingly complex security landscape. The documents reveal converging priorities on China as a pacing challenge and integrated deterrence, even as questions persist about the future of the transatlantic partnership.

Strategic Alignment on Core Threats

The 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, released during the Biden administration, established China as the Department of Defense’s “most consequential strategic competitor and pacing challenge.” The strategy marked Russia as an “acute threat” while also addressing persistent challenges from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organisations. Similarly, the UK’s 2025 SDR, commissioned by Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s government and led by former NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, identifies Russia as an “immediate and pressing threat” while characterising China as a “sophisticated and persistent challenge.”

Both strategies emphasise the concept of “integrated deterrence” – coordinating military power with diplomatic, economic, and technological tools across domains and with allies. The U.S. NDS defines this as “developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect,” while the UK SDR operationalises it through a “whole-of-society approach” and “NATO-first” policy focused on European security.

Key Strategic Priorities Compared

The Evolving US-UK Defence Partnership

The UK’s 2025 SDR arrives amid significant scrutiny of the “special relationship” with the United States, particularly following President Donald Trump’s return to office. Analysis from Chatham House and the Atlantic Council highlights Britain’s continued dependence on U.S. technology, particularly for its Trident nuclear deterrent system, which relies on American-made missiles and maintenance support from Lockheed Martin.

Despite this interdependence, the SDR represents what the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) describes as “one of the more realistic assessments of the United Kingdom’s security posture in recent memory.” The review commits to increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 with an ambition to reach 3% in the next parliament, though analysts note this falls short of the 3.5% target discussed at NATO’s 2025 summit in The Hague.

Lessons from Ukraine and Technological Transformation

Both strategies incorporate hard-won lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. NDS emphasises campaigning – “the conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives” – as essential to countering coercion. The UK SDR goes further, committing to build up to 7,000 new long-range weapons domestically and establishing an “always on” munitions production capacity to avoid the stockpile shortages exposed by the conflict.

Technological innovation features prominently in both documents. The U.S. strategy focuses on accelerating force development and “getting the technology we need more quickly,” while the UK aims to become a “leading tech-enabled defence power” by 2035 through investments in autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and a £1bn Digital Targeting Web to be delivered by 2027.

Implementation Challenges and Alliance Dynamics

While both strategies present ambitious visions, implementation questions remain. The Brookings Institution noted in its 2022 analysis of the U.S. NDS that “integrated deterrence and campaigning should be non-controversial” as returns to Cold War concepts, but questioned whether mechanisms exist “to develop good strategies of integrated deterrence with the skill and speed that events might require.”

For the UK, the British Foreign Policy Group observes that Washington “will want proof, not promises” regarding the SDR’s commitments, particularly given the Ministry of Defence’s historical average of 6.5 years to deliver major programmes. The review’s European focus also represents a shift from the “Indo-Pacific tilt” emphasised in the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review, potentially complicating U.S. expectations of burden-sharing across theatres.

Frequently Asked Questions

How does the UK’s nuclear deterrent depend on the United States?

The UK’s Trident system relies on American-made D5 missiles maintained by Lockheed Martin in the United States, with missiles returning to the U.S. for scheduled maintenance every few years. The UK also purchases aeroshells for its warheads from the U.S. While operationally independent, this creates significant dependence, with the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement extended indefinitely in 2024.

What is “integrated deterrence” as defined in the U.S. strategy?

The 2022 National Defense Strategy defines integrated deterrence as “developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theatres, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships.” It represents a holistic approach beyond traditional military deterrence.

How has the UK’s defence spending commitment changed?

The 2025 Strategic Defence Review commits to spending 2.5% of GDP on defence by 2027, accelerating a previous commitment, with an ambition to reach 3% in the next parliament subject to economic conditions. This represents increased spending but falls short of the 3.5% target discussed at NATO’s 2025 summit and the 5% reportedly sought by the Trump administration.

What role does China play in both strategies?

In the U.S. 2022 NDS, China is identified as the “pacing challenge” – the most consequential strategic competitor requiring urgent adaptation of U.S. forces and strategy. The UK’s 2025 SDR describes China as a “sophisticated and persistent challenge,” focusing on its technological advancement and military modernisation while maintaining the primary immediate focus on European security and Russia.